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ARTICLES
BASIC ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ANALYSIS
Russell W. Galloway*
I. INTRODUCTION
The establishment clause,1 wrote Hugo Black in his majority
opinion in Everson v. Board of Education,2 "was intended to erect
'a wall of separation between church and State.' "' The Supreme
Court has bombarded Jefferson's wall of separation in recent years,
and some Justices have even threatened to dismantle it.4 But the
Court continues to scrutinize with some care government action that
aids religion or entangles government and religion and to strike
down such action with surprising frequency.
How does the establishment clause work? This article describes
the basic structure of establishment clause analysis. The purpose is
to help law students, lawyers, and judges understand and apply the
diverse strands of Supreme Court law in this complex and often con-
troversial field.'
© 1989 by Russell W. Galloway, Jr.
* Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law; J.D., 1965, Columbia University
School of Law; Director, Supreme Court History Project; member of the California bar.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The clause provides, "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion ... "
2. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
3. Id. at 16 (quoting Thomas Jefferson).
4. Justice Rehnquist, for example, wrote:
There is simply no historical foundation for the proposition that the Framers
intended to build the 'wall of separation' that was constitutionalized in Ever-
son. . . . The 'wall of separation between church and State' is a metaphor
based on bad history, a metaphor which has proved useless as a guide to judg-
ing. It should be frankly and explicitly abandoned.
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106-07 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
5. Guidance may be especially helpful since, as Justice Rehnquist put it, "[Tihe Estab-
lishment Clause presents especially difficult questions of interpretation and application."
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The legal analysis developed by the Supreme Court in its effort
to enforce the establishment clause may be summarized as follows.6
Establishment Clause; Basic Analysis
I. Preliminary questions
A. Does the ocurt have jurisdiction?
B. Is the claim justiciable?
C. Was the harm caused by government action?
II. On the merits: Did the government violate the establishment
clause?
A. Applicability: Did the government aid or become
entangled with religion?
B. Compliance: Did the government action constitute an
unconstitutional "law respecting an establishment of
religion"?
1. Facially discriminatory aid
a. Did the government facially discriminate
among religious groups?
b. If so, the action is unconstitutional unless strict
scrutiny is met (presumption of unconstitution-
ality; government has burden of proof)
1) Does the government action further a
compelling interest?
a) Compelling interest? and
b) Substantially effective means? and
2) Is the government action necessary (the
least onerous alternative)?
2. Nondiscriminatory aid: The action is unconstitu-
tional unless the Lemon three-prong test is met
(presumption of unconstitutionality; government has
burden of proof)
a. Secular purpose? and
b. Primary secular effect? and
c. No excessive entanglement?
3. Unique historical evidence: the action is constitu-
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 392 (1983). "It is not at all easy, however," Rehnquist contin-
ued, "to apply this Court's various decisions construing the Clause .... '[W]e can only dimly
perceive the lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law.'"
Id. at 393 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)).
6. This analysis reflects establishment clause law at the time of this writing. The law
could change soon, however, since Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, and White are prepared to




tional if there is clear historical proof that the
Framers did not intend to prohibit the aid.
III. Remedies
Let us translate this outline into prose. A claimant seeking re-
dress for an alleged violation of the establishment clause must ini-
tially meet three preliminary requirements.' First, the court must
have jurisdiction over the claim. Second, the claim must be justicia-
ble. Third, the conduct giving rise to the claim must be government
action. Failure to satisfy any of these requirements normally results
in dismissal without reaching the merits of the establishment clause
claim.
If claimant satisfies the preliminary requirements, the court will
proceed to the merits of the claim. On the merits, the analysis has
two components.8 First, one must determine whether the establish-
ment clause is applicable, i.e., whether the government aided or be-
came entangled with religion.'
Second, if the establishment clause is applicable, one must de-
termine whether the government complied with the Supreme Court's
establishment clause rules. The Court has developed three separate
rules for enforcing the clause. First, if the aid- is facially discrimina-
tory, it is unconstitutional unless the government satisfies strict scru-
tiny by proving that the aid is necessary for furthering a compelling
government interest.1 Second, if the aid is facially nondiscrimina-
tory, it is unconstitutional unless the Lemon three-prong test is
7. These are standard preliminary requirements that apply throughout constitutional
law.
8. The two-part structure of the analysis is the same for all constitutional limits. See
Galloway, Basic Constitutional Analysis, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 775 (1988). In applying
any constitutional restriction on government action, one should ask first whether the limit is
applicable-e.g., is this the kind of government action that is subject to this limit?-and second
whether the government complied with the rules the Supreme Court has developed for enforc-
ing the limit. In short, the analysis on the merits of any constitutional limit focuses on two
questions: (1) applicability and (2) compliance. Id. at 782-85.
9. Throughout the rest of this article, the phrase "aided religion" will be used as a
shorthand for "aided or became entangled with religion."
10. See infra notes 28-36 and accompanying text. As the Court put it in Hernandez v.
Commissioner, 109 S. Ct. 2136 (1989),
Our decision in Larson z,. Valente supplies the analytic framework for evaluat-
ing petitioners' contentions. Larson teaches that, when it is claimed that a de-
nominational preference exists, the initial inquiry is whether the law facially
differentiates among religions. If no such facial preference exists, we proceed to
apply the customary three-pronged Establishment Clause inquiry derived from
Lemon v. Kurtzman.
Id. at 2146-47 (citations omitted).
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met," i.e., unless the aid has a secular purpose, the primary effect of
the aid is secular, and the aid does not result in excessive entangle-
ment between government and religion. 2 Third, if there is clear his-
torical evidence that the Framers intended not to prohibit the partic-
ular form of aid, the aid does not violate the establishment clause."
Compliance with the establishment clause requires that the govern-
ment satisfy at least one of these three tests.
If the establishment clause is inapplicable or the government
satisfies one of the three tests, the analysis ends. If, on the other
hand, the establishment clause is applicable and its requirements are
not met, one must proceed to the question of remedies.
The next section discusses each step of basic establishment
clause analysis in more detail.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Preliminary questions
Before reaching the merits, an establishment clause claimant
must satisfy the three standard preliminary requirements that apply
throughout constitutional law, i.e., claimant must show that the gov-
ernment harmed him or her enough to create a justiciable claim that
is within the jurisdiction of the court.
1. Does the court have jurisdiction?
Claimant must show that the court has jurisdiction over the
claim. This requirement sometimes raises issues in establishment
clause cases. This article will assume that jurisdiction is present in
all relevant cases.
2. Is the claim justiciable?
To qualify for a decision on the merits, the claim must involve a
justiciable controversy between adverse parties. Justiciability
problems surface repeatedly in establishment clause cases. This arti-
cle will not provide a detailed analysis of justiciability issues, but a
few comments concerning taxpayer standing may be helpful.
In general, federal taxpayers do not have standing to challenge
11. Id. The test received its classic formulation in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971).
12. See infra notes 37-84 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
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the constitutionality of action by the federal government." Federal
taxpayers, however, do have standing to bring establishment clause
claims if the Flast v. Cohen double-nexus test is met."6 Under this
test, federal taxpayers have standing if 1) they are challenging con-
gressional action under the taxing and spending power" and 2) they
allege that the action violates a constitutional restriction on the tax-
ing and spending power.' In Flast, the Court held that the estab-.
lishment clause is a limit on the taxing and spending power, so fed-
eral taxpayers may attack congressional spending programs that
violate the clause.
3. Was the harm caused by government action?
The establishment clause, like most other constitutional limits,
applies only to the government. When a person acting in a private
capacity aids religion, he or she need not comply with the establish-
ment clause. If the challenged aid is given by a government official,
the government action requirement is met unless the conduct was
unrelated to the official's government duties. If the aid was given by
a private person or entity, the government action requirement is not
met unless the government either compelled the conduct or en-
couraged it so substantially that the decision must be attributed to
the government."
If claimant does not satisfy the three preliminary requirements,
the claim should be dismissed without reaching the merits of the es-
tablishment clause issues. If claimant satisfies the preliminary re-
quirements, one may proceed to evaluate the establishment clause
claim on the merits.
14. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923).
15. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1968), created an exception to the Frothing-
ham general rule that federal taxpayers do not have standing.
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
17. Flast, 392 U.S. at 102-03.
18. See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982), where the Court stated:
[C]onstitutional standards are invoked only when it can be said that the State is
responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains. . . . [A]
State normally can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has
exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either
overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State.
Id. at 1004. A symbiotic relationship between the government and the private party in which
the government profits from the private conduct may also satisfy the government action re-
quirement, although the status of this rule is in doubt. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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B. On the merits: Was the establishment clause violated?
Analysis of establishment clause claims on the merits involves
the same two-step inquiry that applies to all constitutional limits.
One must determine first whether the establishment clause is appli-
cable, i.e., whether the government action that harmed claimant was
the kind of government action that is subject to the establishment
clause. If so, one must determine second whether the government has
complied with applicable establishment clause requirements.
1. Applicability: Did the government aid or become entangled
with religion?
The establishment clause applies only to government action that
aids religion or entangles the government and religion. 9 In most
cases, the Court does not discuss this component of establishment
clause analysis in detail. The Justices know that government aid to
and/or entanglement with religion raises establishment clause
problems, and they often proceed directly to the question whether
the government conduct can be squared with the tests the Court has
developed for enforcing the clause.
On several occasions, however, the Court has plainly stated that
the establishment clause restricts government aid to religion. In Ev-
erson,2" for example, the Court stated, "Neither a state nor the Fed-
eral Government ...can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another." 1
Similarly, the Court has stated that the establishment clause re-
stricts entanglement between the government and religion. Everson,
for example, states, "Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious or-
ganizations or groups and vice versa."' 22 As the Court later put it in
Lemon, "[tihe objective is to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion
of either into the precincts of the other."2
If the government action that harmed claimant does not involve
aid to religion or entanglement between government and religion, the
19. The Court has identified "three main evils against which the Establishment Clause
was intended to afford protection: 'sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of
the sovereign in religious activity.' " Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (quoting
Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
20. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
21. Id. at 15. The Everson opinion went on to list other examples of government action
prohibited by the establishment clause.
22. Id. at 16.
23. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614.
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establishment clause does not apply and the establishment clause
analysis ends. If, on the other hand, the challenged government ac-
tion does aid religion or entangle the government and religion, the
analysis proceeds to the question of compliance.
2. Compliance: Does the government action satisfy one or
more of the three tests the Supreme Court has adopted for enforcing
the establishment clause?
If claimant was harmed by government action that aids religion
or entangles the government with religion, the establishment clause
applies, and the next issue is whether the government complied with
the rules developed by the Supreme Court for enforcing the clause.
The Supreme Court has adopted three different analytical tests
for determining whether government action of this kind complies
with the establishment clause. First, government action that facially
discriminates among religious groups, favoring some over others, is
unconstitutional unless strict scrutiny is satisfied, i.e., unless the gov-
ernment proves that its action is necessary to further a compelling
interest.24 Second, facially nondiscriminatory government aid to reli-
gion is unconstitutional unless the government satisfies the Lemon
three-prong test,2" i.e., unless the government action has a secular
purpose, a primary secular effect, and does not result in excessive
entanglement between the government and religion. Third, if histori-
cal evidence demonstrates unequivocally that the Framers did not in-
tend the establishment clause to prohibit the government action, then
the government action is constitutional.26
The next three sections discuss each of these three tests sepa-
rately. The greatest emphasis will be given to the Lemon three-
prong test, since that is the test the Court has used in all but two
recent cases.27
a. Strict scrutiny of facially discriminatory aid to
religion under Larson v. Valente
If the challenged government action facially discriminates
24. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246, 255 (1982). See infra notes 32-36 and accom-
panying text.
25. Lemon, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See infra notes 37-84 and accompanying text.
26. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying
text.
27. The two exceptions are Marsh, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), and Larson, 456 U.S. 228
(1982).
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among religious denominations, favoring some over others, strict
scrutiny is applicable, and the government action violates the estab-
lishment clause unless the government proves that its conduct is nec-
essary to further a compelling interest."
Application of this test proceeds in two steps. First, one must
determine whether the government facially discriminated among reli-
gious entities. Second, one must determine whether strict scrutiny is
met.
1) Discrimination among religious groups?
The threshold question is whether the government facially dis-
criminated in favor of some religious entities over others.29 Govern-
ment discrimination may take three forms: facial, in effect, or in ef-
fect and purpose. Larson involved facial discrimination, but the
opinion did not make clear whether strict establishment clause scru-
tiny would also apply to nonfacial discrimination. This issue was
apparently resolved by Hernandez,"° which states:
Larson teaches that, when it is claimed that a denominational
preference exists, the initial inquiry is whether the law facially
differentiates among religions. If no such facial preference ex-
ists, we proceed to apply the customary three-pronged Estab-
lishment Clause inquiry derived from Lemon.s"
28. The landmark case on this issue is Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982). Larson
involved a Minnesota law imposing registration and reporting requirements on charitable so-
licitors, but exempting religious institutions that receive more than 50% of their financial sup-
port from member contributions. Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court held that this law
discriminated on its face in favor of established denominations and against cults such as the
Moonies, that strict scrutiny was therefore applicable, and that Minnesota failed to satisfy
strict scrutiny because its law was not sufficiently effective in furthering the government's
interests.
For several years, it was not entirely clear whether the Larson strict scrutiny test would
survive as a component of establishment clause law. Larson was a 5-4 decision. Rehnquist,
White, O'Connor, and Burger dissented. After Scalia replaced Burger and Kennedy replaced
Powell, it appeared that the vote might go the other way. Larson held in the alternative that
the Lemon test was not satisfied, so it was possible to argue that the entire strict scrutiny
discussion was dictum. In Hernandez v. Commissioner, 109 S. Ct. 2136, 2146 (1989), how-
ever, the Court reaffirmed the Larson test, so strict scrutiny remains applicable to facially
discriminatory government aid to religion.
29. Hernandez, 109 S. Ct. 2136 (1989). Facial discrimination is discrimination on the
face-that is, in the words-of the statute, regulation, or court decision controlling the govern-
ment action.
30. 109 S. Ct. 2136 (1989).
31. ld. at 2146 (citations omitted).
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2) Is strict scrutiny satisfied?
If the government did discriminate among religious denomina-
tions in a way sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny, then the govern-
ment conduct violates the establishment clause unless it is necessary
to further a compelling interest. This is the same strict scrutiny test
that is used in equal protection, free speech, privacy, and free exer-
cise cases. It is commonly viewed as a two-prong test, but it actually
involves three components: (1) the government must have a compel-
ling interest; (2) the conduct must further that interest, i.e., it must
be a substantially effective means for advancing that interest; and (3)
the conduct must be necessary, i.e., the least onerous alternative for
furthering that interest. 2 The first two components are commonly
grouped together in the first prong of strict scrutiny.
a) Does the aid further a compelling interest?
(1) Compelling interest?
If Strict scrutiny is applicable, the government must prove that
the aid program is actually intended to further a very strong, permis-
sible, secular purpose. 8 First, the interest relied upon by the govern-
ment must be permissible. In this context, this means especially that
there must be a purpose other than furthering religion. Second, the
interest relied upon must have been one of the government's actual
purposes in giving the aid. Third, the interest must be very strong.
(2) Substantially effective means?
Next, the aid program must "further" the government's compel-
ling interest in a substantially effective manner. 4 If the program is
not a substantially effective means for furthering the interest, there is
no compelling justification for the discrimination. If the program is
only remotely or speculatively effective, it is unconstitutional.
b) Is the aid necessary?
Finally, the government must show that the discriminatory aid
program is necessary (the least onerous alternative) to further the
32. See Galloway, Means-End Scrutiny in American Constitutional Law', 21 Loy.
L.A.L. REV. 449, 453-55 (1988).
33. Id. at 450.
34. Id.
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compelling interest." If less onerous alternatives, such as nondis-
criminatory aid, are available, there is no compelling need to dis-
criminate. Of course, the alternatives must be substantially effective
or the government need not use them. In fact, cases in other areas
suggest that the government is not required to use alternatives unless
they are equally effective. 6
b. The Lemon three-prong test
In nearly all cases decided since Lemon v. Kurtzman," the
Court has applied the test developed in that case to determine
whether government aid to or entanglement with religion violated
the establishment clause. The Lemon three-prong test requires the
government to prove that its challenged action (1) has a secular pur-
pose, (2) has a primary secular effect, and (3) does not excessively
entangle the government with religion.
If the government fails to satisfy any of these three prongs, its
conduct violates the establishment clause. Therefore it is necessary to
discuss each prong separately.
1) Secular purpose
To satisfy the Lemon test, the government must prove that its
challenged conduct was undertaken to further a secular purpose. 8
To meet this test, the government must articulate what secular pur-
pose it claims it was pursuing. The purpose must be legitimate, i.e.,
constitutionally permissible. It must be secular, i.e., something other
than to advance or endorse religion. 9 And it must have been an ac-
tual purpose, i.e., one that the government officials really had in
mind, rather than a speculative purpose suggested after the fact by a
government lawyer.4" A secular purpose that is a sham or pretext
will not satisfy this test."'
There is some dispute whether the secular purpose test is a
35. Id. at 451.
36. Id. at 471, 478.
37. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
38. "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose . Id. at 612.
39. "In recent years, we have paid particularly close attention to whether the challenged
governmental practice . . . has the purpose .. .of 'endorsing' religion." County of Allegheny
v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3100 (1989).
40. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586-87 (1987).
41. "While the Court is normally deferential to a State's articulation of a secular pur-




sole-purpose test or a primary-purpose test. Lynch v. Donnelly4 2
states that the Court will find violations of prong one "only when it
has concluded there was no question that the statute or activity was
motivated wholly by religious considerations."4 In Edwards v.
Aguilard," however, the Court suggested several times that the rele-
vant question is whether the "preeminent purpose" or "primary
purpose" of the government action is religious."' It remains to be
seen whether the sole-purpose or primary-purpose test will prevail.
The secular purpose test, prong one of the Lemon three-prong
test, is normally quite easy to meet."' It has, however, been fatal in
some of the Court's most controversial establishment clause cases. In
retrospect, it probably accounts for the constitutional ban on public
school prayer adopted in Engel v. Vitale.47 It was fatal to public
school Bible reading and recitation of the Lord's Prayer." And it
also brought down Louisiana's equal-time-for-creation-science stat-
ute,49 a Kentucky law requiring the posting of the Ten Command-
ments in public school classrooms,5" and Tennessee's version of the
Scopes "monkey law" prohibiting the teaching of evolution. 1
2) Primary secular effect
Prong two of the Lemon three-prong test requires that the chal-
lenged government action have a primary secular effect, i.e., that the
conduct not have the primary effect of advancing religion."2 This test
42. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
43. Id. at 680.
44. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
45. Id. at 590, 591, 593.
46. E.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983), which states:
Little time need be spent on the question of whether the Minnesota tax deduc-
tion has a secular purpose. Under our prior decisions, governmental assistance
programs have consistently survived this inquiry even when they have run afoul
of other aspects of the Lemon framework. . . .This reflects, at least in part,
our reluctance to attribute unconstitutional motives to the States, particularly
when a plausible secular purpose for the State's program may be discerned from
the face of the statute.
47. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). When Engel was decided, the secular purpose test had not yet
been formally promulgated.
48. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
49. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
50. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
51. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
52. "Second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhib-
its religion ...." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). "In recent years, we have
paid particularly close attention to whether the challenged governmental practice . . . has the
...effect of 'endorsing' religion. ... County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086,
3100 (1989).
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is more difficult to satisfy,"' has been the most critical of the three
prongs, and accounts for many holdings that government action vio-
lates the establishment clause. 4
Prong two requires the court to determine whether the primary
effect of the government's conduct is secular or religious. This is a
very subjective judgment, and even the Supreme Court's decisions
have been far from consistent. The test is sufficiently vague to permit
the Justices to reach whatever result they favor. The Justices have,
however, identified several factors that should be considered in evalu-
ating the primary effect of the government's conduct.55 The ensuing
sections will discuss these factors.
a) How broad is the class of beneficiaries?
The first factor focuses on the scope of the class of potential
beneficiaries of the government action. If the class is broad and in-
cludes both nonreligious and religious beneficiaries, the Court is
more likely to find that the primary effect is secular.5 6 As the Court
has put it, "[A] program . . . that neutrally provides state assistance
to a broad spectrum of citizens is not readily subject to challenge
under the Establishment Clause. ' '57 If the class is narrow and lim-
ited to persons or entities with religious affiliations, the Court is
more likely to find that the primary effect is religious. 8
b) Channeling of benefits: direct vs. indirect aid
Another important factor in determining whether the primary
effect is secular or religious is whether the government benefits are
channeled directly to religious institutions or indirectly to those insti-
tutions through other individuals or entities who make independent
decisions. If the aid is direct, the Court is more likely to find an
establishment clause violation. If the aid is indirect, a violation is less
likely.
53. E.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2571 (1988) ("As usual in Establishment
Clause cases, . . . the more difficult question is whether the primary effect of the challenged
statute is impermissible.").
54. See, e.g., Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
55. The first two factors are more significant in cases involving financial aid to religious
institutions than in cases involving the intrusion of religion into government.
56. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (tax deductions for educational
expenses are constitutional in part because the deductions are available to all parents).
57. Id. at 398-99.
58. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (tuition rebates
and tax deductions violated the establishment clause in part because they were limited to par-




Where the assistance to religion is channeled through individu-
als, the Court is more tolerant, because it considers the aid more
attenuated and less likely to be viewed as a government endorsement
of religion.59 As the Court put it in Mueller,
[B]y channeling whatever assistance it may provide to parochial
schools through individual parents, Minnesota has reduced the
Establishment Clause objections to which its action is subject.
.. . Where, as here, aid to parochial schools is available only as
a result of decisions of individual parents no 'imprimatur of
State approval,' . . . can be deemed to have been conferred on
any particular religion, or on religion generally. . . . The his-
toric purposes of the Clause simply do not encompass th sort of
attenuated financial benefit, ultimately controlled by the private
choices of individual parents, that eventually flows to parochial




If the government aid flows directly to religious institutions, the
Court is more likely to find that the primary effect is religious. The
analysis is affected, however, by another critical factor, namely
whether the religious institution is religion-pervaded or not.
(a) Religion-pervaded institutions
When the government gives direct aid to religion-pervaded in-
stitutions, the Court is very likely to find that the primary effect of
the aid is religious. In cases of this kind, the Court requires assur-
ances that there is no "substantial risk" that the aid will be used to
further the institution's religious mission.6 General assurances are
not enough; the government must specifically prove that the aid is
not furthering religion. This means that audit procedures must nor-
mally be adopted to insure that the aid is used solely for secular
purposes. Absence of such audit procedures will normally result in a
finding that the primary effect of the aid is religious.62 Ironically, the
presence of such audit procedures normally results in a finding that
59. See, e.g., Mueller, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
60. Id. at 399-400.
61. E.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2576 (1988).
62. See, e.g., Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
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there is excessive entanglement that violates prong three of the
Lemon test.63 This is a Catch-22 that will be discussed further
below.6'
(b) Non-religion-pervaded institutions
Direct aid to religious institutions that are not religion-pervaded
is much more acceptable to the Court. In such cases, the "substantial
risk" test apparently does not apply," and the Court is content with
generalized assurances that the aid will not be used to further the
institution's religious mission. If such assurances are given, the
Court will normally find that the primary effect of the aid is secular.
Cases involving government aid to church-related schools pro-
vide the classic illustration of the distinction between religion-per-
vaded and non-religion-pervaded institutions. Church-related grade
schools, junior high schools, and high schools (so-called parochial
schools) are presumed to be religion-pervaded, so direct financial aid
is strictly limited.66 In contrast, church-related colleges are normally
not religion-pervaded, so direct financial aid is usually permitted.67
However, if the particular college is religion-pervaded, the Court
will presumably treat it like a parochial school and require specific
assurances that the aid will not be used to further religion.
c) "Any more than" test
A third factor that plays an important role in determining
whether government aid to religion has a primary secular effect is
whether the aid is less significant than aid upheld in prior cases. As
the Court put it when deciding that inclusion of a manger scene in a
government Christmas display did not have a primary secular effect,
63. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985). Aguilar, a companion to Ball,
supra note 62, held that the audit procedures required by federal law permitted defendant to
satisfy the primary secular effect test but caused it to violate the excessive entanglement test.
64. See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
65. Bowen, 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988). "Only in the context of aid to 'pervasively sectarian'
institutions have we invalidated an aid program on the grounds that there was a 'substantial'
risk that aid to these religious institutions would, knowingly or unknowingly, result in reli-
gious indoctrination." Id. at 2576.
66. See, e.g., Aguilar, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
67. Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (annual noncategorical
grants); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (one-time construction loan from fund gener-
ated by state-issued bonds); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (federal construction
grants for facilities devoted to secular education). In all three cases, the Court upheld the aid to




"We are unable to discern a greater aid to religion deriving from
inclusion of the creche than from these benefits and endorsements
previously held not violative of the Establishment Clause."68 Profes-
sor Van Alstyne has dubbed this mode of analysis "an 'any more
than' test."69
Ultimately, the question whether government aid to religion has
a primary secular effect must be answered on the basis of the totality
of the circumstances, but the Court's opinions make clear that the
circumstances considered should include the three factors mentioned
above, namely the scope of the beneficiary class, whether the aid goes
directly or indirectly to religious institutions, and whether the aid is
any more than that approved in earlier cases. If other factors appear
relevant, they too should be weighed.
3) No excessive entanglement
The third prong of the Lemon test requires the Court to find
that the challenged government conduct does not result in excessive
entanglement between government and religion."0 In recent years,
the Court has tended to construe this test narrowly and to find exces-
sive entanglement only when the challenged action results in "com-
prehensive, discriminating, and continuing state [or federal]
surveillance. 7
1
Like the primary secular effect test, the excessive entanglement
test requires litigants and courts to consider a series of factors enu-
merated in Supreme Court opinions. Indeed, the factors are quite
similar to those relevant to prong two, namely the nature of the in-
stitution, the nature of the aid, the relationship between the govern-
ment and the beneficiary, and, in some cases, whether the aid causes
political divisiveness among religious groups.72
a) Nature of the institution
In examining the nature of the institution receiving the govern-
ment aid, the most important consideration is whether the institution
68. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 682 (1984).
69. Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall-A
Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770, 783.
70. "Finally, the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with
religion." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
71. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403 (1983) (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619).
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion referred to "the 'comprehensive, discriminating, and con-
tinuing state surveillance' necessary to run afoul of this standard.
72. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.
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is religion-pervaded or not.7 If it is religion-pervaded, close monitor-
ing is needed to insure that the aid does not have a primary religious
effect, and such monitoring is likely to involve excessive entangle-
ment.74 This is the Catch-22 that has haunted establishment clause
law and caused much criticism of the excessive entanglement test:
"the very supervision of the aid to assure that it does not further
religion. renders the statute invalid."7 6
b) Nature of the aid
One must also consider whether the aid is structured in a way
that gives rise to excessive entanglement.76 Thus, for example, one-
time grants are less likely to cause entanglement than continuing
aid. 7 Similarly, paying for textbooks is less likely to cause entangle-
ment than paying teachers' salaries.78 And government assistance in
administering standardized student tests is less likely to result in ex-
cessive entanglement than financial support for development of tests
by parochial school personnel, since the latter tests require more
careful monitoring.79
c) Relationship between government and religious
institution
This is the central question in determining whether the exces-
sive entanglement test is met. One must examine the relationship
between the government and religion resulting from the challenged
government action.80 The totality of the circumstances should be in-
spected, and all entanglements should be identified and discussed.
73. See, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 685-87 (1971).
74. E.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
75. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2578 (1988).
76. E.g., Tilton, 403 U.S. at 687-88.
77. E.g., Tilton, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); but cf Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd.,
426 U.S. 736 (1976) (holding that continuing grants are not always unconstitutional).
78. "Unlike a book, a teacher cannot be inspected once so as to determine the extent and
intent of his or her personal beliefs and subjective acceptance of the limitations imposed by the
First Amendment." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
79. Compare Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980) (standardized
tests) with Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (tests prepared by
teachers).
80. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614 (stressing that courts should examine "the cumulative




Beginning with Lemon,8' the Court has repeatedly discussed
whether the challenged aid to religion is likely to result in political
competition between religious groups. The concept is that the gov-
ernment should not induce religious institutions to become rivals for
places at the public trough.82
For a while it seemed as if the political divisiveness test might
be a fourth prong of the Lemon test. Later cases, however, made it
clear that political divisiveness is one factor to be considered in deter-
mining whether the excessive entanglement test is met.8 3 Most re-
cently, the Court has stated that the political divisiveness test "must
be regarded as confined to cases where direct financial subsidies are
paid to parochial schools or to teachers in parochial schools." 84
To summarize, if the Lemon three-prong test is applicable, the
government conduct violates the establishment clause unless it has a
secular purpose and a primary secular effect and does not result in
excessive entanglement between government and religion.
c. The historical evidence test of Marsh v. Chambers
In Marsh v. Chambers,8 the Court upheld the Nebraska legis-
lature's practice of opening each day with a prayer by a chaplain.
The Court did not apply the Lemon test. Instead it stressed "the
unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200 years"86 of
legislative prayers approved by federal and local government from
the Framers to the present. In light of the "unique" historical roots,
going back to the First Congress that proposed the establishment
clause, the Court concluded that "the First Amendment draftsmen
. . .saw no real threat to the Establishment Clause" in legislative
prayer.
87
If, in a particular case, there is a comparable history of accept-
ance going back to the Framers, the government may prevail under
the Marsh test. But the language of Marsh, with its repeated stress
on the "unique" evidence of approval beginning with the Framers
81. 403 U.S. at 622-24.
82. "[Plolitical division along religious lines was one of the principal evils against which
the First Amendment was intended to protect." Id. at 622.
83. E.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
84. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 404 n.l (1983) (quoted with approval in Bowen v.
Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2578 n.14 (1988)).
85. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
86. Id. at 792.
87. Id. at 791.
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and "unbroken" ever since, suggests that successful invocations of
Marsh will be rare. To date, Marsh has no progeny. 88
If' the establishment clause is inapplicable or the government
has satisfied at least one of the tests developed by the Supreme Court
for enforcing the clause, claimant loses on the merits, and the analy-
sis ends.
If, on the other hand, the preliminary requirements are met and
claimant prevails on the merits by proving that the establishment
clause is applicable and the government did not comply with its re-
quirements, claimant wins on the merits, and the final issue is what
remedies are in order.
C. Remedies
In general, if the aid is found unconstitutional, it should be en-
joined. If the aid program is unconstitutional on its face, the entire
program should be enjoined. If the aid program is unconstitutional
as applied, i.e., in specific cases, those specific violations should be
enjoined.89
III. CONCLUSION
Basic establishment clause analysis proceeds in three steps.
First, the preliminary requirements (jurisdiction, justiciability, and
government action) must be met. Second, the merits of the establish-
ment clause claim must be considered. One must determine whether
the establishment clause is applicable, i.e., whether the government
has aided religion or become entangled with religion. If so, one must
determine whether the government has complied with the require-
ments of the establishment clause, i.e., whether the government has
satisfied the Larson strict scrutiny test, the Lemon three-prong test,
or the Marsh historical evidence test. If the establishment clause is
applicable and the government has not complied with its require-
ments, claimant wins on the merits, and questions concerning reme-
dies must be addressed. Hopefully, this analytical model will help
law students, lawyers, and judges conduct establishment clause anal-
yses in an orderly and accurate fashion.
88. It is possible that Marsh will generate progeny. For instance, if anyone should chal-
lenge the Court's practice of opening its sessions with the invocation "God save this honorable
Court," the Court will probably use the Marsh test to uphold the traditional invocation.




On the basis of the foregoing discussion, it is possible to set
forth the following, more detailed outline of basic establishment
clause analysis.
Establishment Clause; Basic Analysis
I. Have the preliminary requirement been met?
A. Does the court have jurisdiction?
B. Is the claim justiciable?
C. Was the harm caused by government action?
II. On the merits
A. Applicability
1. Aid to Religion?
2. Entanglement between government and religion?
B. Compliance
1. The Larson strict scrutiny test for facially discrimi-
natory aid
a. Does the aid facially discriminate among
religious groups?
b. If so, is strict scrutiny satisfied?





(3) Compelling (very strong) inter-
est?
b) Substantially effective means?
2) Was the government action necessary? (the
least onerous alternative)?
2. The Lemon three-prong test for nondiscriminatory
aid
a. Secular purpose?
1) If sole purpose is to further religion, not
met.
2) If there is a secular purpose, but the
primary purpose is to further religion,
perhaps not met; the law is unsettled.
b. Primary secular effect? Relevant factors in-
clude:
1) Scope of class of beneficiaries
1989]
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2) Channeling of benefits
a) Indirect aid, channeled through indi-
viduals, is more likely constitutional.
b) Direct aid to religious institution is
more likely unconstitutional.
(1) Religion-pervaded institutions
must show there is no "substan-
tial risk" the aid will be used to
further religion; monitoring may
be required.
(2) Non-religion-pervaded institu-
tions need only give general as-
surances.
3) "Any more than" test: is the challenged
aid more substantial than that approved in
prior cases?
c. No excessive entanglement? Relevant factors
include:
1) Nature of beneficiary institution
a) If religion-pervaded, excessive entan-
glement is more likely.
b) If not religion-pervaded, excessive en-
tanglement is less likely.
2) Nature of aid
For example, one-time aid is less likely to
involve excessive entanglement.
3) Relationship between government and reli-
gious institution; totality of circumstances;
weigh all entanglements.
4) Political divisiveness
a) If the aid goes directly to religious
institutions, political divisiveness is
evidence of excessive entanglement.
b) If the aid does not go directly to
religious institutions, political divisive-
ness is not relevant.
3. The Marsh historical evidence test
The aid is constitutional if there is strong historical
evidence that the Framers thought the aid was
permitted (and the aid has been continuously
permitted ever since?).
III. Remedies
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